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1CROSS-PACIFIC INTERNATZONALZSATZON OF R&D BY
U.S. AND JAPANESE FIRMS
For many decades both management theorists and managers believed that R&D
would remain concentrated in the home country of multinational corporations
(MNCs). Even in the early 1980s, leading management scholars argued that the
concentration of technology development and new product research and development
in the home country was one of the few remaining mechanisms that enabled the
headquarters to control the strategies of its subsidiaries (Doz and Prahalad
1981).
However, the 1980s witnessed a rapid geographic dispersion of R&D in the
world's major MNCs. Many firms engaged in offshore R&D for the first time during
this period, some by acquisition and some by the establishment of new
laboratories. Other large NCs had considerable experience managing offshore
development activities, but they moved during this decade to enhance the
capabilities of their overseas facilities and to integrate them more closely with
the home country organisation and with each other. The R&D expenditures of U.S.
firms overseas have been growing more rapidly than their xpenditures at home,
even though ReD continued to be dominated by the home country: in 1988 U.S. firms
spent the equivalent of 10.5% of their domestic R&D expenditures on R&D overseas,
compared to 7.6% in 1985 (Brainard 1992: 8). A survey of Japanese firms by
Japan's Science and Technology Agency in 1989 found that 19.2% of large Japanese
companies already maintained R&D operations offshore and that another 9.6% were
planning to establish R&D offshore in the future.'
No single factor adequately explains these developments. Instead, a
combination of factors involving changes in scientific and technology systems,
markets, competition, and government policies have led firms to try to penetrate
the technology systems of countries outside their original home base and to
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2increase the cross-border coordination of their technology development centres
(Doz 1987; De Meyer & Mizushima 1989; Westney 1990). The impact of these changes
was reinforced by (and integrally linked to) dramatic changes in the model of the
multinational corporation (MNC). Influential management writers such as Prahalad
and Doz (1987), Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) and Ohmae (1990) traced the emergence
of a new" kind of MNC, the network" multinational composed of interdependent
subunits whose capacity for cross-border coordination and learning made it
possible for the MNC to take advantage of the "best" elements of each of its many
locations. The rapidity with which this concept was espoused by top management
in MNCs worldwide was revealed in a survey of top managers in U.S., European, and
Japanese MNCs conducted by a leading consulting firm in the late 1980s. It found
a consensus among those surveyed that: "What we have called the 'global network'
model of technology management is clearly the 'wave of the future' when it comes
to competing globally. This model consists of a network of technology core
groups in each major market -- the U.S., Japan, and Europe -- managed in a
coordinated way for maximum impact." (Perrino & Tipping, 1989: 13)
However, attempts to develop coordinated international R&D networks took
place not only from different historical bases of internationalisation but also
in the context of differing national and industry trends in the role of R&D
within the corporation. In general, the 1980s saw large, R&D-intensive U.S.
corporations making efforts to link R&D more closely to products and customers
by linking the function more closely to business units and to make better use of
external technology and reduce the reliance on internal technology development
(Corcoran 1992). R&D budgets tended to be under considerable pressure in the
1980s in many industries, particularly in the second half of the decade: in the
United States, the average annual real increase in industrial R&D expenditure was
only 1.5% between 1985 and 1990. Japanese firms, on the other hand, were trying
to expand their work on fundamental technologies and become more "autonomous" in
technology development; R&D budgets in most firms were expanding steadily.
The paper examines the strategies of cross-Pacific internationalisation of
R&D in U.S. and Japanese firms in the electronics industry. It examines the
3context of these strategies in the changing models of the MNC and different
trends in the evolution of the R&D function, and the differences and similarities
in the management challenges these firms have faced and expect to face in the
coming decade.
1. Changing Models of the Multinational Corporation
By the mid-1980s, an emerging typology of MNCs distinguished between those
whose organization was multi-domestic," in which national subsidiaries were
focused on their local markets, carried out production and marketing activities
locally, and had a significant measure of autonomy from headquarters, and
=global" companies who concentrated their production and administrative
activities in one location (usually the home country) in order to reap the cost
and control advantages of economies of scale (Bartlett, 1981 and 1986; Porter
1986).
No sooner had the model been articulated and widely diffused, however, than
managers and researchers found themselves moving beyond it. Increasingly, firms
found that they were facing simultaneous pressures for global integration and
local responsiveness. The vulnerabilities of the "global" organizational
structure had been revealed by the volatile exchange rates of the 1980s, which
exposed a firm whose production was concentrated in one country to unpredictable
variation in costs relative to revenues (Kogut, 1985; Lessard, 1986). As a
growing number of "global" firms tried to disperse manufacturing activities in
order to reduce their political risk and exchange rate exposures, "multi-
domestic" firms moved to find a division of labour among their subsidiaries that
would enable them to capture greater scale economies within their multinational
network. In other words, a growing number of multinationals seemed to be trying
to move toward a model that combined elements of the strategies of both the
global and the multi-domestic. This new form has been given various names - the
"trar.snational" (Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989); the "dual focus firm"
(Pcy-.er and White, 1989); the multifocus" firm (Prahalad and Doz, 1987); and
the ':eterarchical organization" (Hedlund, 1986). Academic usage seems to be
cc. :-ing on the somewhat less idiosyncratic term, "the integrated network
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4model" of the MNC (see for example Solvell and Zander 1991).
Although the general features of the network model are widely shared, the
very different patterns and timing of internationalisation in European, U.S. and
Japanese firms have left them with very different challenges in moving toward the
"integrated network". To oversimplify considerably, U.S. and European firms have
historically developed relatively strong country subsidiaries in major markets
(although Asia remains for many a black hole," to use Bartlett and hoshal's
term for a country or region that is strategically important but where the MNC
lacks significant presence). Such firms are most concerned with increasing
cross-border integration based on global product organisations or business units
and with reducing the role of country subsidiaries and local integration.
Japanese firms, which have much more recently moved production offshore, have
tended to have relatively weak country organisations and relatively strong
functional (and increasingly business) linkages between Japan and the offshore
operations. The variant of the integrated network model popular in Japan
emphasizes the need to build strong regional (rather than country) subsidiaries
in North America and Europe, with a complete integrated value chain from product
development to sales (e.g. Iwai 1991). In contrast to the Western firms'
emphasis on cross-border integration, the Japanese variant of the model
emphasizes intra-regional or local integration as the first priority in building
the network MNC.
The integrated network model insists on the importance of an international
"innovation network," of which dispersed technology development capabilities are
a critically important element. Two key countries in this dispersion are the two
leading national science and technology systems in the world, the United States
and Japan. But trends in the scale and organisation of industrial R&D have
differed considerably in these two nations in the 1980s, and these trends have
a powerful impact on the patterns of internationalisation of R&D followed by U.S.
and Japanese firms.
2. Trends in Industrial R&D in the United States and Japan
In very general terms, industrial R&D in the 1980s in U.S. and Japanese
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5firms was profoundly shaped by the increasingly intense cross-Pacific
competition. Often responding to Japanese competition, large U.S. companies
tried to reorganise their R&D systems to increase the link between the
marketplace and technology development, in order to reduce time to market,
increase quality and manufacturability, and improve responsiveness to customer
needs (see for example Stalk and out 1990). In practice this often meant
putting more of the power to allocate R&D funding in the hands of business units
and reducing the time frame of R&D projects (Corcoran 1992). These efforts were
complemented by fforts to make more effective and efficient use of external
technologies (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989: 213-219).
Large Japanese firms, in contrast, excelled in the close linkage between
R&D and manufacturing, setting the world standards for time to market and design
for manufacturability. They were also seen to outperform U.S. firms in making
efficient and effective use of externally-derived technologies (Manfield 1988).
However, in Japan growing emphasis was placed on ishu iutsu - self-generated
technology, meaning increasing reliance on technology generated within Japan (see
for example the 1988 White Paper on Science and Technology, subtitled Sozoteki
Kenkvu Kankvo no Kakuritsuo Mezashite [In Search of the Foundations of an
Environment for Basic Rsearch], and growing reliance on internally generated
technology within firms.2
This has meant rapidly rising expenditures on RD in Japan and a growing
emphasis on fundamental research and on longer time horizons for R&D. In part
these trends were a response to growing resistance from Western firms on giving
their Japanese counterparts access to their technology, and in part to a
perception that as the Asian NICs gained on Japan in terms of production
technology, the Japanese comparative advantage would increasingly lie in
technology development (see for example The Economist, Jan. 12, 1991).
Companies in each system were bent on learning from each other: U.S.
corporations tried to analyse and learn from Japanese systems for linking R&D
with production and with the customer, while Japanese corporations studied U.S.
fundamental research institutions such as 8ell Labs, IBM's corporate research
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6centres, the major U.S. research universities, and technology centres such as the
North Carolina Resaearch Triabgle Park. U.S. firms tried to make their R&D
organisations more responsive to the needs of their business units, while
Japanese firms emphasized the role of their R&D organisations in creating new
businesses from technology "seeds". And as part of this learning and extension
of technical capabilities, U.S. firms began in increasing numbers to set up R&D
facilities in Japan, while Japanese firms extended their R&D organisations into
the United States (Herbert, 1989).
But U.S. and Japanese firms approached the challenges of building an
international R&D network with somewhat different concepts of the ideal MNC and
different trajectories of change in their R&D systems.
3. Cross-Pacific R&D Investments by Leading Electronics Firms'
One of the ironies of the cross-Pacific internationalisation of R&D in the
last few years has been that while U.S. firms have been quicker to seize on the
rhetoric of the "transnational" or integrated network model than the Japanese,
the Japanese firms have actually come closer to building an integrated cross-
border R&D network, and U.S. firms have come closer to building the strong local
presence that the "localisation" rhetoric of Japanese firms has held up as a
model.
This pattern is exemplified y the electronics industry. The 1990 global
Fortune 200 included fourteen U.S. electronics firms and 10 Japanese firms
(Exhibit 1). Of the U.S. firms, only five maintain dedicated, wholly-owned R&D
centres in Japan (Exhibit 2). IBM has three R&D labs in Japan, the largest of
which employs over 3,000 people. Eastman Kodak, DEC, and T have all recently
invested in major new laboratories in the Tokyo metropolitan area, which combine
under one roof several technologies and both global and local research mandates.
For IBM, astman-Kodak, Dec, and TI, the Japanese R&D facilities are legally part
'. Over the past year, an MIT research team conducted interviews in six
corporate and fourteen divisional labs of Japanese electronics companies in the
United States, and three of the four U S. electronics firms that maintain sizable
wholly-owned R&D facilities in Japan.
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7of their Japanese country subsidiary.
Four companies, including H-P, have large joint venture firms that had a
significant technology development capability (the others are Xerox, 3M, and
Honeywell). They all created those ventures in the era when a wholly-owned
subsidiary in Japan was virtually impossible for foreign firms. The oldest,
Yamatake-Honeywell, was set up in 1949, Sumitomo-3M in 1960, Fuji-Xerox in 1962,
and Yokogawa-Hewlett-Packard in 1963. Yamatake-Honeywell was centred on
Honeywell's building controls system, and its technical capabilities in that
field now rival those of its parent. Technology ties between the two firms are
not close, compared to the other three firms, which regard their Japanese joint
ventures as an integral part of their technology network, although many such
firms would like to improve the flow of technology from Japan back to the rest
of the MNC.3 After years of struggling for autonomy and for recognition of the
value of expanding its capabilities, it is sometimes difficult for a joint
venture company to accede willingly to closer integration with its offshore
parent. However, Hewlett-Packard is the first U.S. company in this industry to
supplement a long-standing Japanese joint venture with a wholly-owned R&D
subsidiary. It is an integral part of the corporate R&D operations rather than
the Japanese joint venture.
The remaining six firms (GE, Westinghouse, Motorola, Raytheon, TRW, and
Emerson) have no designated R&D centres in Japan; the level of their involvement
in Japan varies from the relatively high profile of Motorola (with wholly-owned
manufacturing facilities in Aizu-Wakamatsu and a manufacturing joint venture with
Toshiba that included a development capability) to Raytheon's one relatively
small joint venture. Interestingly enough, when GE acquired RCA it also acquired
one of the oldest Western-owned technology development facilities in Japan: the
RCA ngineering Laboratories Ltd. in Tokyo, founded in the 1950s as a basic
research laboratory. Even even under RCA this lab" had been reduced to a
virtually nominal presence; it now functions as a licensing office.
Of the ten Japanese firms listed, only one -- Sanyo -- has no significant
wholly-owned R&D presence in the United States (see Exhibit 3). For the
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8remaining nine companies, the extent of their presence varies across companies,
but most maintain multiple units. Five of the firms have both corporate and
divisional labs, mirroring to some extent their R&D structures in Japan. The
corporate labs are often incorporated separately, and are legally wholly owned
subsidiaries separate from the manufacturing and marketing organisations in the
United States. Those labs are widely dispersed geographically, and vary
considerably in size and management systems.
Fujitsu, for example, not only has a minority stake in Amdahl, a computer
company with a significant R&D capability, but also seven wholly-owned R&D
organisations, distributed across North Carolina, Txas, and several sites in
California. Sony has two corporate R&D labs in the U.S. and 11 divisional labs.
Matsushita has eight R&D facilities, in several sites in California, New Jersey,
and Illinois. Two other companies (Toshiba and Hitachi) have relatively small
R&D presences, although Toshiba has supplemented this by acquisitions of small
high-tech firms such as Diasonics in medical equipment and Vertex in
semiconductors. Most of the facilities are relatively young, many being set up
between 1988 and 1991 (of the twenty labs we visited in the course of our
research project, only two were established before 1988). Sharp has a single
engineering facility in Oregon.
The Japanese R&D investments that have attracted the greatest attention in
the U.S. have been those that established basic research labs. NEC, Mitsubishi
Electric, and Canon have all set up basic research centres that are have
relatively broad mandates and long time horizons. NEC's Princeton facility,
opened in 1989, is the largest with 50 professionals; Mitsubishi in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and Canon in California, both established in 1991, each have under
10 professionals, but plan to expand to 25 in the near future. NEC also
maintains a divisional-level laboratory in Massachusetts; for Canon and
Mitsubishi Electric their basic labs are their first entries into serious R&D
activities in the United States.
4. Wholly-owned U.S. Labs in Japan
The wholly-owned R&D centres of the five U.S. companies in Japan represent
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9an enormous range of capabilities, from IBM Japan with nearly 3500 R&D employees
complementing its full value-chain of manufacturing and marketing, to Hewlett-
packard with 20 engineers.
IBM represents for many mutlinational companies the ideal of a dispersed
R&D network, and its success in establishing a strong R&D organisation in Japan
that competes effectively with leading Japanese companies for the technical
graduates of the top universities was cited as a model by several U.S. firms in
Japan, outside as well as within the electronics industry. Of the three R&D
facilities that IBM maintains in Japan, two are product development labs and one
a research centre. The oldest, the Fujisawa Laboratory, initiated in 1971 and
opened in 1973 adjacent to the Fujisawa factory, now has over 3,000 employees.
The other product development lab is much smaller in scale: the Yasu lab in
semiconductor technology has over 200 employees. The Tokyo Research Laboratory,
currently employing about 250 researchers, evolved from the Tokyo Scientific
Center, established in 1982 as the fourth "R"-focused laboratory in the IBM
system (after the T.J. Watson Center and Almaden in the United States and the
famous Zurich lab in Europe). All three laboratories are legally part of IBM
Japan, and are managed by Japanese.
The other three firms with major R&D centres in Japan are relative
newcomers. Digital Equipment's centre is the oldest, established in 1982 on the
initiative of the Storage Systems and Architecture group (that is, it was a
divisional rather than a corporate initiative). It was incorporated separately
from DEC Japan, which was a marketing organisation with no manufacturing
capabilities in Japan.. In 1987 it was merged with DEC Japan to become part of
a unified country subsidiary. In 1990 it moved to a new research facility in
Yokohama, and employs over 200 professionals both in hardware and oftware
development. Its first director was a bilingual and bicultural Japanese with
extnsive experience in industrial research in the United tates; its second
director, in a reversal of usual patterns, is an American.
Eastman Kodak began planning the establishment of an R&D centre in Tokyo
'in 1984. The company decided to concentrate the activities on the new centre on
1 _ _ ·_ I _ II _
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research and development in its commercial and business systems group and in
electronic imaging, rather than in its traditional areas of chemistry-based
photographic materials. It hired its first employees in 1985, and in 1988 moved
to a new laboratory in Yokohama; it currently has over 100 technical employees.
It too is legally part of the country subsidiary, in this case Eastman Kodak
(Japan) Ltd. Like DEC, Kodak established R&D in Japan with an extensive sales
and marketing organisation but no manufacturing presence. Its first director was
an American from the corporate research labs; after his five-year assignment
ended, his responsibilities were divided between an American Vice-President for
R&D and a Japanese Laboratory Director.
TI, on the other hand, began manufacturing in Japan in 1968, and now has
four factories in Japan. In the mid-1980s it established a design centre at one
of its semiconductor plants, and now has four design centres in Japan. In
addition, it opened a corporate R&D facility, the Tsukuba R&D Cntre, in April
1991. The building is designed to accomodate 350 technical professionals, in the
fields of new materials, advanced electronic devices, integrated systems, and
systems information science (Sakamoto 1991). The centre is legally part of TI
Japan, Inc. but it is organisationally part of Corporate Research, Development,
and Engineering. In all four cases, therefore, the R&D centres are formally part
of the country subsidiary, although they have strong functional links to R&D in
the home country. Its first director is an American, who plans to be succeeded
by a Japanese.
Interviews with R&D managers in these facilities indicate that from the
beginning most have evoled a human resource management system that blends
features of Japanese technology management with parent company patterns. For
example, all have created career paths that are distinct from those in other
functions, allowing engineers to continue a research or research management
career, in contrast to the dominant'model in large Japanese companies, where the
prevailing career trajectory still leads from R&D into divisional line management
(Westney and Sakakibara, 1985). For at least two of the firms, this is a
necessity: Eastman Kodak and DEC do not maintain manufacuring divisions in Japan,
______________________I__
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and the salaries and prestige of the marketing organisation do not match those
of the R&D organisation. In part because their appeal to the "new generation"
of younger Japanese technical graduates rests on their being traditional
Japanese R&D organisations, their "hybrid" management systems constitute a
departure in some respects from established Japanese patterns, even though in
their interface with the Japanese technology system (in recruitment and in joint
projects, for example), they tend to follow established patterns.
Perhaps because of the powerful model offered by IBM Japan, and still more
because of the isomorphic pulls of the home country R&D organisation, the U.S.
firms have tended to establish diversified facilities with a full array of
geographic mandates (from localisation of existing products to the generation of
new products for global markets) and a range of -technologies. In all four
companies, the Japan-based R&D centres aim from very early in their evolution to
achieve the capacity for developing new products, and to plan carefully for
enhancing their capabilities over time, within the constraints imposed by the
budgeting process. Those constraints can be considerable, as we shall see below.
4. Japanese R&D Centres in the United States
The most marked distinction across the different Japanese labs in this
industry is not the difference between corporate and divisional labs (so marked
in Japan -- see Westney and Sakakibara 1985) but between the basic research labs,
which have strong similarities across the three companies, those (corporate or
divisional) established directly by the Japanese parent, and those that have been
acquired.
The basic research labs have been given guarantees of funding from
corporate R&D in Japan for a five year period, and the expectation is that they
will be planning for a five to ten year horizon. The broad parameters of the
research fields in these labs was set by the parent company, but the U.S.
professionals being recruited to staff these centres have very great latitude in
setting the research agenda. These facilities are very consciously given a great
deal of autonomy in management systems as well as in research agendas: all three
companies have stated publicly that among their goals in establishing the
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facility is learning more about U.S. systems of managing basic research. All
three centraes are staffed by Americans and limit severely the number of Japanese
researchers on site. The NEC lab in Princeton has stated that all its
researchers must be U.S. citizens or permanent residents, and the other two labs
have stated that they will limit the presence of Japanese researchers to one or
two. As is common with basic research labs everywhere, their densest
communications links seem to be with universities rather than with other local
company facilities or even with the home-country R&D organisation. For all
three, the main "output" expected is published papers and patents: the adoption
of the U.S. academic research model is very marked, and several of the leading
researchers have been recruited from faculty positions in leading universities.
The labs that were acquired already had established a product niche and a
management system; they tended to be fairly large (usually over 100 researchers);
and therefore they tended to maintain a level of autonomy second only to the
basic R&D labs. Among the labs studied by our research team were four that were
incorporated into the company's R&D networks by acquisition: two in Fujitsu and
two in Toshiba. Fujitsu acquired Intellistor, a Colorado computer peripherals
firm, in 1985, and brought it under the Fujitsu umbrella of Fujitsu Computer
Products of America, Inc. Intellistor's founder serves as President and CEO of
FCPA, and reports formally to one of the Directors of Fujitsu Ltd. in Japan.
Intellistor, with 180 employees, has become Fujitsu's main development centre for
disk drives, and has only four Japanese on its presmises: two to assist on
design, and two to act as communications links to Japan. There are no Japanese
in management positions. This spring five of Intellistor's engineers were on
secondment to Fujitsu in Japan, transferring technology to the parent company
(for further details see Voisey 1992).
Fujitsu's most recent acquisition, OSSI (Open Systems Solutions Inc.),
purchased in 1991, is a much smaller-scale enterprise, with only 30 employees.
It is a California-based software company that works for its parent on a contract
basis. It is also working closely with Fujitsu's UK subsidiary, ICL, on joint
software development.
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Toshiba's two acuqisitions provide an interesting contrast. The first,
Toshiba America MRI Inc., was produced by putting together an acquired enterprise
(acquired 1989), the magnetic resonance imaging division of Diasonics, with
Toshiba's own MRI unit. After the acquisition, Toshiba's attempts to have the
new organisation sell Toshiba's own competing lines of equipment and to merge the
acquired unit into its own management systems led to a massive outflow of
technical people (over 100 left during the first two years). The President and
the head of the Finance Department are currently Japanese, and there are 2-3
Japanese technical people in the organisation of 220 employees (110 of whom are
engineers).
Perhaps as a result of this experience, when Toshiba acquired Vertex
Corporation in 1991, a company that designs and manufactures high-performance
ASICs, the company was left with a very high level of autonomy. It is the only
U.S.-based Toshiba subsidiary not have have a Japanese top manager, and no
Japanese have been assigned to its 100 employees. Turnover in employees since
the acuqisition has been low, and the company has been assigned the sole
responsibility for dealing with the high end customers for ASICs. The company
is only beginning to face certain problems of integration as it embarks on
projects that involve closer technical coordination with the Japanese technical
organisation, but clearly the initiative for dealing with those problems, to
date, lies with the U.S. operation.
There is great variation across the other corporate and divisional-level
facilities in size, technology mandate, and management systems. But one
commonality is their relatively high level of specialisation and focus: each lab
tends to work in one technology or product area, and to lack the capacity to
generate a complete product. In consequence, they must interact closely with the
Japan-based parent technology organisation.
In general, while both Japanese and U.S. R&D managers in these companies
agree on the need to use American rather than Japanese management systems in the
United States, those labs that interact with local manufacturing operations are
being pulled toward modifying some U.S. patterns of project management in order
EQ1118"·1111113"-"-"-·"II
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to work more effectively with manufacturing operations that have followed some
Japanese-style patterns. This echoes trends that are more advanced in the auto
firms, where the R&D centres of Japanese firms have found it necessary to
introduce some Japanese-style R&D management systems in order to follow Japanese
practices of design for manufacturability and simultaneous engineering. Perhaps
in consequence, they tend to have a higher proportion of non-locals in the
facilities than is the case for the basic research centres, the acquired units,
or indeed the U.S. units in Japan.
However, one can argue that perhaps these facilities constitute a more
fruitful opportunity for the U.S. technology system than either of the other two
types of Japanese-owned facilities. Just as the U.S. firms in Japan pose an
alternative set of patterns to those institututionalised in large Japanese labs,
so the introduction of simultaneous engineering and other features of Japanese
technology management in these U.S. facilities, and its "hybridisation" with
other asepcts of management, will constitute a valuable source of variation
within the U.S. technical system.
6. Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Approaches
The four U.S. firms with wholly-owned R&D facilities in Japan have under
one roof (or in IBM's case, three roofs) an array of technologies and a set of
research mandates that include both the development of new products for world
markets and the adaptation of existing products to the local market. The
Japanese facilities tend to be more specialised both in technologies and in
research mandates; a number of facilities are still extremely small. The most
obvious explanation for the Japanese pattern -- the relative newness of the R&D
investment in the United States -- gives way before the observation that at least
two of the U.S. facilities are equally new. And at first blush it would seem
that a foreign company would find it far easier to build critical mass in an R&D
centre in the United States than in Japan, given the much tighter Japanese
technical labour markets.
However, technical labour markets do provide a partial explanation for the
__ .___ _I
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U.S. pattern: given the great difficulties in Japan of attracting good technical
people, the visibility and the symbolic commitment of a consolidated, large, and
well-equipped laboratory have been valuable in recruitment. Moreover, the much
greater geographic dispersion of technical centres of excellence and of lead
users in the United States provides greater incentives for dispersion and
specialisation. Fujitsu Network Transmissions Inc., for example, splits its R&D
activities between two sites: one-third of its 120 engineers are in a software
development group in San Jose, one of the nation's major centres for software
development, and the rest in Texas near one of the division's most important
customers, MCI (Voisey 1992). Still another factor behind the Japanese pattern
may be that the companies are making a virtue of one of the features of U.S.
technical professionals that they find most difficult: the very high levels of
specialisation and relative indifference to the integration of an individual
specialty with other parts of the value-added chain, even within R&D4.
But however reasonable and well-suited to the particular context the U.S.
and Japanese approaches may be, they pose somewhat different management
challenges. One consequence of the greater specialisation of the Japanese R&D
centres is that they are, of necessity, more closely integrated with the R&D
organisation in Japan than with other local functions or with each other.
Technology developed in the U.S. -- whether it is the software development that
constitutes a very significant element of the activities of the Japanese
companies in this industry or the technology being developed at the basic
research labs - must be either passed to Japan and integrated there for
embodiment in products and systems, or integrated in the United States with
strong support from Japan. While this pattern can be portrayed as closely
approaching the "integrated network" model extolled by writers such as Perrino
and Tipping, it is a substantial mismatch with the ideal of the localised
regional company articulated by the top management of most of these firms. And
this contradiction can create future problems, both internally (in the violation
of the 'psychological contract' with U.S. engineers who expect greater autonomy)
and externally (in the growing public policy debates over technology flows that
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are likely in the United States in the 1990s -- see Mowery and Rosenberg 1989:
274-289). In the public policy context, ironically, one of the main foci of
contention may be the basic research labs that Japanese firms are establishing
in the United States, although these have the highest degree of local autonomy
and the most clearly enunciated goals of contributing to the local technology
systems through the creation of new knowledge. The fact that these centres are
not integrated with local development and manufacturing operations, but rather
with advanced development groups back in Japan, may be seen as a contradiction
of the localisation" rhetoric of Japanese firms.
U.S. firms in Japan, on the other hand, face a different problem:
integrating their Japan-based R&D with the rest of their R&D organisation and
building its capabilities to the point where it can indeed become the global-
scale technology development centre, contributing and applying technology to the
overall company R&D network. There are three major ways to integrate across
borders: integrated funding systems, joint projects, and cross-border assignments
of technical people. As mentioned above, most U.S. firms (not only in this
industry) have moved in the 1980s to allocating most of their R&D budgets through
their business units on a world-wide basis, in order to link R&D activities more
closely to business needs. One consequence has been (at least reportedly) a
shorter-term orientation, one concommitant of which is a reluctance to put
funding into projects in new and relatively untested R&D centres offshore (a
problem, we should note, that is not distinctively American; it is shared by
several Japanese companies).
One way for an offshore R&D centre to build internal credibility and to
enhance its own capabilities is the joint project with the home-country R&D
organisation. However, managing cross-border joint R&D projects is a complex
undertaking, and the learning involved often takes more time than anticipated.
A common result is a delay in the schedule. At a time when most US firms are
focused on reducing time to market, businesses are reluctant to continue to
invest in building cross-border learning curves.
One potential reaction to the vicissitudes of funding is that the offshore
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centre tries to develop its own project agenda, often focused on the local
market, and to shield itself from the uncertainties of interactions with the
parent organisation. Historically, R&D in firms such as IBM and Fuji-Xerox
developed their capabilities to the enviable level of today by focusing on local
innovations for the Japanese market, largely funded by the local organisation.
However, the extent to which U.S. firms have relegated to country subsidiary to
a nominal role in their organisation, subordinating country to business and
function, have given country organisations much less ability to allocate funding
to local R&D. However, the pulls toward local autonomy remain strong in Japan-
based operations of foreign firms, especially in R&D, and may work against the
realisation of the global network" model.
Cross-border assignments of technical people are a critical element of
cross-border integration in this function, and provide a further contrast. The
Japan-based R&D organisations of U.S. firms are staffed overwhelmingly by locals.
While firms do assign some of their home country nationals to Japanese R&D
centres, the dominant mode of cross-border transfer is to bring locals to the
home country organisation for training and for network-building. Japanese firms
have engaged in some posting of locals back to the home country organisation, the
dominant mode of cross-border postings is dispatching Japanese to work in the
United States. Once again, although there are sound reasons for these
differences, the effect is a contradiction between the flow of people and the
internationalisation model espoused on each side of the Pacific.
7. Conclusion
U.S. and Japanese firms alike engaged in a rapid cross-Pacific
internationalisation of R&D during the last decade, each side being driven by
strongly-held models of what an international firm should be and what kinds of
capabilities it needed to develop. But the patterns of R&D facilities that were
actually established in response to the R&D agendas of the firms and the
technical environments in which they had to operate offshore are in some sense
out of line with the models of internationalisation each side is espousing. The
potential dangers of this mismatch of grand strategic vision and implementation
·111 ----- -- - _
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are considerable. Firms may have to reevaluate either their strategies or their
implementation in ways that go beyond the R&D function alone. U.S. firms may
have to reexamine their subordination of geography to business and function in
their grand strategies; Japanese firms may have to change their model of
"localisation" to a model of "transnationalisation".
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1. Survey results published by the Science and Technology Agency (1989). Cited
in Sakamoto (1991).
2. See for example the 1987 publication by the Japan Productivity Association
(Nihon Seisansei Honbu) entitled Jishu Gijutsu Kaihatsu to soshiki. ini senrvaku
(Organisational and Personnel Strategies for the development of Autonomous
Technology).
3. Based on presentations by company spokepeople at a National Research Council
Council Japan-U.S. workshop on industrial R&D in Calfornia, 1990.
4. Based on interviews with Japanese R&D managers in six of the eight companies
listed.
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EXHIBIT 1:
U.S. AND JAPANESE ELECTRONICS FIRMS IN THE
FORTUNE 200 -- 1990
UNITED STATES
COMPANY
IBM
GE
Kodak
Xerox
DEC
Westinghouse
3M
Hewlett-Packard
Motorola
Raytheon
TRW
Honeywell
Emerson
TI
JAPAN
COMPANYRANK
5
7
50
54
78
79
88
89
128
143
174
179
185
197
Hitachi
Matsushita
Toshiba
NEC
Mitsubishi Electric
Fujitsu
Sony
Sanyo
Canon
Sharp
RANK
9
12
24
32
42
49
57
107
118
121
EXHIBIT 2: U.S. FORTUNE 200
ELECTRONICS FIRMS
TECHNOLOGY PRESENCE IN JAPAN
IBM
GE
Eastman Kodak
Xerox
DEC
Westinghouse
3M
H-P
Motorola
Raytheon
TRW
Honeywell
Emerson
TI
3 R&D labs in Japan
Licensing offices
R&D lab
JV
R&D Lab
Strategic alliances
JV
JV, R&D centre
Strategic alliances
Technology Liaison Office
JV
R&D Lab
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EXHIBIT 3: JAPANESE FORTUNE 200 ELECTRONICS
FIRMS' TECHNOLOGY PRESENCE IN U.S.
Corporate Lab Divisional
Lab
Acquired
R&D
Hitachi
Matsushita
Toshiba
NEC
Mitsubishi Electric
Fujitsu
Sony
Sanyo
Canon
Sharp
X
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
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